It was the second day of the operation in March 1979 when Captain Abure (ADC 1/Head of State Research Bureau, East Lango District and Lt Philly Katema (ADC 1/ Head of State Research Bureau), West Lango District, rounded up more than 80 businessmen, civil servants and mistakenly took away one madman Onapa Cogo, from Apac town and took them to Lira. Only Moses Ocen’s cousin Oboko jumped out of the Mercedes Benz bus taking them to Lira and ran for dear life. The SRB guys had jumped out of the bus to chase a man who was riding a bicycle, wearing a greenish shirt (which they probably thought was a army shirt).

‘Bloody Sunday’ was preceded by ‘Bloody Thursday’ and ‘Bloody Saturday’.

The operation was coordinated by a Mr Ali Ochama, an Alur who was a driver of the Northern Province Bus Company (Olilim-Amugo-Lira-Apapc-Akokoro route) , who was for years known as a jolly driver but turned out to have been a State Research guy.

On ‘Bloody Sunday’ , current senior prisons officer Robson Odur had to squat in the external bathroom on their compound for 6 hours because SRB guys had packed their blue Peugeot 404 pick-up and had assembled all those being arrested on the back compound of the house of Odur’s father Allon Ojok. Allon Odur Ojok whose name was also on the list of those to be picked, engaged the SRB in a race on a motorcycle versus Peugeot unless they gave up on catching him on Aminteng road and returned to town more annoyed, ending up arresting a mad man they took and never returned. His tale of cheating death is still the talk of the town to date.

Robson Odur of Uganda Prisons and his brother Geoffrey Okae of Uganda Police as well as many others like Ogwang Olet (known as Ogwang Atin Lyec), Otim Toga and a couple of many young men and women who witnessed and were probably traumatised for life are still alive.

In fact I had a drink with Robson Odur the other day in Lira and asked him why he did not just bolt out of the damn external bathroom and run for life as the SRB guys may have wanted to pee and got him right there. He said he will never understand why he chose to squat in that bathroom for six hours.

What I have never understood was why a government which knew it was about to fall could pick up its perceived enemies just for one last massacre.

Of course Amin’s government fell barely three weeks later and the part I did not like was when the crowd in town got enraged and excited and thought they should get rid of anyone associated with Amin, without really knowing whether they were Amin’s sympathizers or not. The first victim lynched was a guy named ABDALLAH AMIN ORYONO, one of the few Muslims around, then the DPC Mpaulo, the Musoga and Lt Philly Katema, the Munyarwanda and a Mugisu businessman named John Walukhu. Katema and the DPC perhaps deserved it; both did not know where to run after Kampala had fallen and chose to stay until a local militia composed of ex-soldiers and commanded by Oyuru Aguru and one Adoko-Cuda gunned them down after a rather childish stand-off lasting three days till April 13, 1979.

Billie Kademeri
UAH member in Paris

Facebook To Begin Charging Users $2.99/mo Starting November 1st

The social media giant says they will start charging members $2.99/mo to use the services that the site has to offer.

“After thinking long and hard about this decision, at the end of the day, we were forced to add this monthly fee,” Facebook founder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg told reporters. “If we don’t do something about our rising costs now, Facebook could cease to exist in the near future.”

In an interview with CNN, Facebook spokesman Paul Horner explained the reason for the new monthly fee.

“Economic times are tight, the ads on Facebook are not as profitable as we had planned. Our costs are going up as hundreds of thousands of individuals continue to join the site every day,” Horner said. “There’s so many pictures of cats, and all of those costs add up, we just can’t foot the bill any longer.”

Jack Phillips from Dequincy, Louisiana told reporters that he is not happy with the new monthly fee that will be implemented by Facebook.


I do remember Binaisa saying that he found documents where your father wanted to change the name of Uganda to ‘Idi Republic’. When his court jesters asked him what the people would would be called called, he said they would be known as ‘Idians.’ They old him that sounded like Indians whom he had expelled only six years earlier.

Amin then said ‘OK then the people of Idi Republic would be known as Idiots’. Good he forced to flee with his tails between his legs before he made us all ‘Idiots’, including yourself, even if it would have been just for a while.

Secondly, Amin didn’t fight in world war 11 as some history books report. Idi Amin claims in the 1974 auto-portrait ‘General Idi Amin’ by Barbet Schroeder, that he was forced and taken to fight in World War II.The actual fact, backed by British Army records, is that Amin joined the army on 10th December 1946, when WWII had already ended more than a year before.

Compatriots, it is on record that Amin joined the King’s African Rifles in 1946 as an assistant cook. The Second World War ended sometime in 1945 therefore it is very unlikely that Amin knew much about the WWII let alone fight it. Apparently to most of the British Officers under whom Idi Amin served in the King’s African Rifles he was ”a splendid chap, though a bit short on the grey matter”. I believe Amin wasn’t born a killer but instead trained by the British to become a one.

Billie O’Kadameri

UAH member in Paris


Museveni, has increased his sponsership to UNAA from the current annual package of $20.000 to $100.000 annually. Additonally Brian Kwesiga wasted no time by taking advantage of the Ugandan rulers presence by requestimg him to grace UNAA’s 27th annual convention which will take place in New Orleans, LA next year. Museveni last attentiended UNAA in Seattle, WA in 1994. Museveni also promised to renergize the current diaspora desk which has been under MOFA. Effective immdediatly the diaspora desk will be linked to the presidents office.

On record,this makes UAH the only Uganda organization in diaspora that Museveni has not infiltrated yet. And that statement is solely based on information we have, again yet.

Edward Mulindwa.


I have been thinking back in time, 1979 to be specific when the late Professor Lule was removed . Then young and naïve we got into the business of distributing flyers “no Lule no work”. The minister of defense then was Mr. Yoweri Museveni (Kaguta) seems to have been added later).

It is fair to say YM then never had total control over security forces, but still unleashed terror nonetheless. The only person who almost took him and won was the late Lameck Ntambi who nearly succeeded in blowing up a trailer tanker full of gas near Nile Mansions. It would have incinerated all those in there including YM and many others. Back then perhaps due to sheer stupidity all the big shots resided in Nile Mansions.The late Mr Ntambi was working with the late Dr Lutakome Kayiira. Mr Ntambi was bolder and daring than Dr Kayiira.

So I shudder what YKM is capable of doing today. Uganda is at real cross road. The opposition has neither a Mwai Kibaki nor RAO. But NRM too does not have a Uhuru Kenyatta either. Remember in 2002, Mr. Moi picked UK who put up a spirited challenge to the NARC coalition. Therein lies the real tragedy for NRM. When YKM is done, and done he will one day, there will be no NRM.

For some reason, I doubt the brigadier Muhoozi Kainerugaba’s chances in spite of what is being said and rumoured. Many are loyal to him precisely because of YKM. Exit YKM and loyalty changes kabisa.NRM will end up like KANU.




The ongoing speedy and controversial trial in the High Court of Jackie Uwera is a clear demonstration of the influence and special status enjoyed by Rwandese in Uganda. The accused is facing murder charges involving the death of her husband Juvenal Nsenga. The accused caused death to the deceased inJanuary 2013 when the car she was driving rn over her husband at the gate of their family house in Kampala.The deseased was a son of Donat Kananura – an influential Rwandese tycoon in Uganda. Donat Kananura has a country home at Butogota in Kanungu District. He owns a chain of powerful business entities in Uganda under KENTRACO (U) LTD which he jointly owns with another influencial Rwandese tycoon Faustin Mpundu. He played a major role in the financing of the RPF invasion of Rwandato topple the Hutu doinated regime of Habyarimana.

The deceased fell in love with the accused in Nairobi when she was 17 years (defilement) and they married two years later. She is a Rwandese and a cousin to Angella Kayihura the wife of Museveni’s powerful Rwandese Inspector General of Police, General Kalekyezi Kayihura. Recently Museveni named him as one of his two most trusted cadres (the other one being General Aronda Nyakairima – the Minister of Internal Affairs). When the accused’s car caused the death of husbans, it was a tragedy that engulfed the entire Rwandese community in Uganda. Among them were two big shots at the helm of law enforcement in Uganda.These are the then Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) Richard Buteera and the Inspector General of Police General Kalekyezi Kayihura. Richard Buteera is a relative of the deceased’s father Donat Kananura. He is a cousin to the late Patrick Karegeya who was an Intelligence chief in Rwanda. He was detained by the Obote II government for supporting Museveni’s bush war in the early 80s. When Museveni took over power, he appointed Buteera as the DPP – a position he held for over 24 years. On the other hand General Kalekyezi Kayihura marries the cousin of the accused.
Amidst the tragedy the issue of management of the deceased’s estate arose. The deceased’s family held that the accused widow had murdered their son and they sought to deprive her of the big estate. The deceased’s brother a one Joseph Kananura openly threatened to kill the accused. According to the accused, her brother based in Kigali alerted her about the impending danger from Joseph Kananura. The accused has told court that Joseph posted these threats on Facebook adding that she knew Joseph had a gun that he had ever used before. Because of the influence and rope pulling of the big shots, nobody bothered to investigate the alleged threat. Instead, General Kayihura placed his accused sister in law under special police protection in the dreaded VCCU/RRU headquarters in Kireka Barraks. Kayihura tasked the Deputy Director of Criminal Investigation and Intelligence, Geofrey Musaana to take charge of the accused’s security and overseeing the investigations into the death of the acused’s husband. On the other hand the deceased’s family ganged up with the DPP Richard Buteera to press for murder charges. The police investigations made a finding of a much lesser offence of causing death by a rush and negligent act as the possible criminal charge against the accused. The DPP Richard Buteera objected to the finding and directed that Murder charges be preferred. The Police (Gen. Kayihura) stuck to their guns in order to save the sister in law. At the end of the day, the DPP on behalf of the deceased’s family prevailed over Kayihura and charges of murder were brought against the accused before the High Court.

Museveni was caught between the rock and the hard surface. He has historical connections with the deceased’s family and Buteera on one hand (prosecution) and needed his most trusted cadre Gen Kayihura (defense) on the other. One of the deceased’s brothers (Innocent Bisangwa) is a senior NRA officer. During the bush war Bisangwa hijacked the government plane from Entebbe airport and took it to the NRA liberated zone in the west. The plane and the hostages were only released in exchange of NRA’s Serwanga Lwanga who had been captured by the military junta in Kampala. Since Museveni captured power Bisangwa’s role has never been clear. He featured in an international arms smuggling scandal in the Americas around the early 90s. Most likely, these arms were for the RPF war against the then Rwanda government. Since then Bisangwa’s role has never been specific only that what is clear is that he is always engaged in Museveni’s highly classified international security errands. After sanctioning murder charges against the accused,later Museveni moved Buteera from the DPP and appointed him as one of the Cadre justices of the Court of Appeal.

During the trial, Prosecution has been mindful of IGP Kayihura’s strong hand in the the bid to save his accused sister in law. In this regard it decided to forego ethics of criminal Prosecution by not calling the investigating officer Geofrey Musana as a prosecution witness.Instead it is the defense who called him to testify in favour of the accused. It is a grand norm that criminal proceedings are instituted by the state. The key players in law enforcement (DPP and Police) being part of the state work closely to protect the public against wrong doers by securing a conviction against an accused. A prudent State Prosecutor mindful of the chain of evidence, parades his witnesses in such away that the investigating officer is the last witness to give evidence before the closure of the prosecution case. It has never happened anywhere else other than in Museveni’s Uganda where a police officer in the service of the state leave alone a whole Deputy Director of CID testifies on behalf of the accused!!!!!!!Geofrey Musana was the officer in-charge of torturing and killing suspects during the notorious Operation Wembly – a quality that earned him the current top position. By testifying against the state, Musana was compelled by Kayihura but at the same time he wanted to demonstrate his loyalty to the rotten system. The DPP is overwhelmingly financially supported by the government of the Netherland to build capacity. Such a development is not only embarrassing but a disappointment to their generosity. For Ugandans who are benefiting from the rotting government under Museveni, such a development goes unnoticed.

With these irregularities, during the trial the defense irreparably punched holes into the prosecution case. But even if the accused is acquitted by the High Court, the state(deceased’s family) will appeal to Court of Appeal where Richard Buteera and Nshimiye (both Rwandese and Museveni’s cadre judges) are strategically positioned to overturn the High Court decision. Therefore the music is just starting.

Cry the beloved country!




While addressing women groups in Mbale over the weekend, Museveni told them that he took the move to promote poverty eradication in the country after his success strategy regarding development of the people in Nyabushozi county and the neighboring places. While it is true that poverty in Nyabushozi has been eradicated, its not true that the methods that were used in Nyabushozi are the same methods that Museveni is preaching to the rest of the country.

Nyabushozi is Museveni’s home area. the neighboring areas are Kazo, parts of Lyantonde and Bwizibwera. Much of all this used to be part of the greater Mbarara district before Lyantonde, Kiruhura and Ibanda were curved out. The area in question is part of ecological cattle corridor and it is dominated by the cattle keepers. Before Museveni came to power, its only Bwizibwera that had signs of development characterised by modern cattle farms and banana plantations, modern permanent houses, a reasonable number of families that had embraced formal education. On other hand, Nyabushozi, Kazo and Kabula were dominated by nomadic cattle keepers who lived in abject poverty who had not so much embraced formal education. However, there existed isolated traditional enlightened families that led a modern lifestyle.

When Museveni took to the bush to fight the then government in 1981, it is this part of the cattle corridor that by his own designs dominated his NRA’s command positions. Shortly before in 1980 Museveni had migrated to Nyabushozi and sought to be elected as the area Member of Parliament (MP) but the residents at the instigation of these few influential enlightened elders outrightly rejected him in favour of their own Sam Kuteesa of the Democratic Party (DP). These enlightened families did not approve of his bush war and that is how apart from Mathew Rukikaire, no Hima was on his NRA political wing. In this regard, he only managed to recruit semi illiterates Himas and Rwandese refugees from the cattle corridor while he drew unsuspecting educated fighters from other areas of western Uganda.

After taking over power, Museveni’s Nyabushozi dominated top command of the NRA went on a looting/thieving spree. These commanders competed for primitive accumulation of wealth. Acquisition of land, modern houses, modern farms with huge numbers of cattle local cattle and armed soldiers guarding them, taking their children and relatives to good schools etc was the order of the day. Museveni assisted them through the ranches restructuring scheme, provision of valley dams, degazeting of Lake Mburo National Park to provide for his Kanyaryeru Luwero war victims, encouraging and protecting cattle keepers to cross from Kazo and invade Katonga wildlife reserve, founding of the State House funded Ngabo Academy, Provision of State House bursaries and bursaries, dominating the Presidential Protection Unit(PPU) now SFG whose pay was above other ordinary soldiers, domination of Revenue Protection Services/URA, State House staffing etc. Actually if one stood at the round about of Busega on the Masaka Road on a Friday afternoon and a Sunday evening you would think that may be the entire government is going and coming from a holiday respectively. The number of posh private cars, government vehicles and army jeeps would be amazing. Many of them would branch off the Kaguta Road and disperse in Nyabushozi while a few would proceed to Rubaale in Ntungamo and Kebisoni in Rukungiri. Ofcourse, such weekend trips would drain the national coffers of billions of shillings while feeding it into Nyabushozi.

Within a short period, a new class of wealthy families emerged in the area. There is a joke in that area where the traditionally wealthy and enlightened elders refer to the emerged wealthy ones as “The Museveni Wealth” as opposed to their traditional wealth. There was also an underground scheme to educate the boys and girls and to help them secure jobs. The scheme was managed by among others the likes of Enos Tumusiime when he was the MD of the defunct URC, Gordon Mwesigwa at the helm of City council, John Nasasira the ‘permanent minister’, Canon Rubunda the State House i/c welfare, Muhinda the tate House Comptroller. Everyone hailing from that area and in position of authority was tasked to assist and account for how much he had assisted. The likes of former IGG Jotham Tumwesigye who could not give in to nepotism were sidelined. There is talk that Museveni was angered by learning that Tumwesigye had not built a modern house at his country home in Nyabushozi and that he was staying in a rented house in Lubowa Housing Estate in Kampala. At one time former Army Commander, James Kaziini publicly thanked the people of Nyabushozi for providing a whole Division of recruits for the army! This implies that almost every home in Nyabushozimay have a soldier or two that earn a salary from the government. The Uganda army has six divisions and if one county of Nyabushozi contributes a Division, then there is a big problem.

After sometime, the new breed of sons and daughters of Nyabushozi acquired the necessary academic qualifications from within and abroad. For them, employment is guaranteed courtesy of high connections in government. They occupy vital positions in URA, State House, ENHAS, CAA, ISO, CMI, Army, SFG, oil sector and now they are venturing into Kayihura’s Police etc. At least almost 70% of the families in that area have a family member in any of the above mentioned sectors. As a result, while other family members ventured into juicy government jobs and security services, their spouses, siblings, offsprings and relatives would use the accruing proceeds to manage fancy shops in most of the fabulous shopping malls in major commercial centers, real estate business, and juicy tenders to supply ‘air’ to government departments. A good number of deceased senior army officers haled from that area. IGoing by the recent publicised survivors benefits of one hundred and sixty million for a single officer fromNyabushozi who died in a recent heilcopter crush in Kenya, you can imagine how much of such money ends up in that geographical area alone. Note that it is very rare for any other fallen soldier’s family to access such benefits since they may not have the necessary connections. Imagine the economic benefits that go with Museveni conducting much of government business from his country home in Rwakitura/Nyabushozi. With all those pilgrims to Rwakitura, Nyabushozi is a tourist destination for both local and foreign visitors. There has been concerted efforts to use the huge financial might to acquire huge chunks of land in Buganda (Kiboga, Mubende and Nakasongola), Tooro (Kyaaka and Rwamwanja) and Bunyoro (Hoima and Masindi). In these new found territories, it is fashionable for army officers from Nyabushozi including Museveni to own huge chunks of land for cattle grazing. Museveni has huge chunks of land in Kisozi Gomba and Kyabiguru along River Kafu.


Tuli Mukintu are a Bantu language words to mean ‘we are in it’. It is now a popular slogan used by those who are benefiting from thieving under Museveni’s patronage. Members of the ‘Tuli Mukintu’ group are identified by the financially paying position they occupy in the government, the luxurious tender they win, the rapid promotions, rank and corresponding financial benefits in the security forces, the fat bank account, the posh car, the real property held in Kampala, glamorous weddings and weekend get- together parties and expensive outings, studies abroad, affording medical treatment abroad, number of foreign trips and the corresponding per diem, etc. ‘Tuli Mukint’u is the Museveni’s regime version of the Iddi Amin’s regime of Mafuta Mingi (those who benefited from illicit trade). It is this Tuli Mukintu that gave rise to the popular saying of “Museveni Mpaka Last’ (Museveni till the end) that is used during election time. It is also a modification of the infamous Bidandi Ssali warning to the electorates during Museveni elections thus ‘olina kewekoledde, londa Museveni’ (have you achieved, Vote Museveni). It is this ‘Tuli Mukintu’ that is driving many Ugandans to cross from the opposition to Museveni’s camp. It is not by conviction but are driven by the urge to join the thieving (‘kuba mukintu’) hence the saying “if you cant win them, join them”.


Therefore, it is not the milk and cattle selling that has improved house hold incomes of residents of Nyabushozi and the neighboring areas but Museveni’s politics of patronage, nepotism, favouratism, sectarianism, and thieving from public coffers. In Nyabushozi, cows and Milk are sold not for income generation but as a waste disposal and to avoid overgrazing. Otherwise for majority of the homes, their income is from weekly and monthly remittances from the son, daughter, father or mother who is in any of the above vital government sectors.For the people of that area and in particular the Himas, Museveni is their lifeline. He is more of their king than a President of Uganda. However, his patronage is currently threatened by the emergence of Gen. Ssejusa on the opposition political scene.




Uganda follows the British model of military ranks and formations. The national army is supposed to be composed of the Infantry, the Air Force and the Marine.

From bottom to top these ranks are: Recruit, Private (Pte), Lance Corporal (L/Cpl), Corporal (Cpl), Sergent (Sgt), Staff Sergent (S/Sgt), Warrant Officer class II (WO II), Warrant Officer class I (WO I), Cadet, Second Lieutenant (2LT), Lieutenant (Lt), Captain (Capt), Major (Maj), Lieutenant Colonel (Lt. Col), Colonel (Col), Brigadier (Brig), Major General (Maj. Gen.), Lieutenant General (Lt. Gen.), General (Gen.).

Recruit is the title held during the first basic training to transform someone from civilian to a soldier thus becomes a Private upon successful completion of training. Cadet is the title given to someone who is undergoing training to become a Commissioned Officers and upon successful completion he becomes a 2Lt. From the rank of L/Cpl to WO I these are referred to as Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) while from 2lt to General they are referred to as Commissioned Officers. Generally all Non-commissioned Officers including Privates are referred to as ‘Men’ while the Commissioned Officers are referred to as ‘Officers’ thus the term ‘Officers and Men’. Among the officer ranks are Junior Officers (2lt – Capt) and Senior Officers (Major and above).

Basically the infantry is composed of riflemen or foot soldiers who are backed by support units like the armored, artillery, and Field Engineering. The smallest formation of an infantry unit is the Section (10 – 12 soldiers), the Platoon (three Sections), the Company or Coy (four Platoons), the Battalion or Bn (four companies), the Brigade or Bde (three or four Battalions) and the Division or Div (three or four Brigades).

A Section is commanded by a Corporal who is referred to as a Section Commander and is assisted by the L/Cpl. A Platoon is Commanded by either a 2Lt or a Lt assisted by a Sgt and is referred to as a Platoon Commander and Platoon Sgt respectively. A company is commanded by either a Major or Capt and are often referred to as Officers Commanding or O.Cs. A Battalion is commanded by a Commanding Officer and often to as C.O. A Brigade is commanded by a Brigadier and is often referred to as a Brigade Commander. A Division is commanded by a General and is often referred to as Division Commander. Any Assistant to any of these positions is referred to as Second in Command (2i/c). A Brigadier is a 1st star General, a Major General is a 2 Star General, a Lt. Gen is a 3 Star General while a General is a 4 Star General. As you will note above, the higher the rank the further one gets away from direct enemy fire thus the saying “Wars are started by Politicians, planned by Generals and fought by Men”.

There are administrative departments of the army that provide the logistical and administrative support to the forces at Company, Battalion, Brigade and Division level. These are linked to the army General Headquarters which seconds them to different formations to handle administrative tasks. These are Administration/Adjutant, Records, Finance/Pay, Intelligence, Medical, Supplies, Political Education/Commissars, Training and Operations, Transport etc. Such Officers hold ranks like S/Sgt, WOs, and Col. Warrant Officers are often referred to as Regimental Sergent Majors (RSMs) at Battalion level or Company Sergent Majors (CSM) at Company level. They are mainly concerned with assisting Commanders on matters of discipline of their Men. Literally, these positions are commonly referred to as Office positions since their holders don’t go to battle.

There is a set out procedure on how one qualifies to move from one rank to another and how to hold a position or an appointment. Promotions for Men is supposed to be proposed by their respective Unit Commanders and confirmed by the Promotions Board at the army headquarters. Promotion for Commissioned Officers is supposed to be proposed by the Promotions Board and confirmed by the Commander In Chief who is the President. This is called the Army Establishment which is supposed to clearly spell out the structures, recruitment, training, promotion, deployment, transfer and retirement of military personnel. Museveni has deliberately undermined the operation of army establishment for his personal interests.That is why the former armies like UNLA under Obote andUA under Amin did not have plenty of Generals and the total absence of the practice of rendering officers redundant (katebe).

Owing to their superior weapons, units like Mechanised, Armored, Artillery, Air Defense, Field Engineering etc provide the regular troops with the necessary superior fire support during combat. Sections of these units are simply attached to regular units but they retain their command link with their mother unit. It is these units that you see on major hill tops of Kampala city. It is these strategically powerful units that Museveni has placed under the command of his son.

When Museveni took to the Bush he took with him both soldiers (UNLA/FRONASA, former Iddi Amin soldiers and some Policemen) and civilians. In the bush formal ranks for Officers were abandoned but instead they were replaced by informal rankings. These were Provisional Junior Officer II (PJOII), Junior Officer II (JOII), Junior Officer I (JOI), and Senior Officer (SO) that were equivalent to 2Lt, Lt, Capt, and Major and above respectively. For the Men or other ranks, the formal ranks of L/Cpl, Cpl, and Sgt remained but S/Sgt and WOs were banned.
Among the Senior Officers (SOs)were members of the High Command and of course Museveni’s rank was Chairman of the High Command (CHC). That is why during the early days of coming to power many were merely referred to as Commander so and so. At the time of capturing Kampala in 1986, the NRA had not more than ten Battalions some of which had composed what was referred to as Saleh’s Mobile Brigade. Even though, these Battalions were not of a full battalion strength. Some of the former UNLAs who had just joined the NRA with their formal ranks initially had problems fitting into the NRA command structure then. There was this reference to ‘original’ and ‘non original’ NRAs. The Twatera Embundu (came from the bush) and the Twaliire (joined after fall of Kampala).
As the NRA numerically expanded, it created three Brigades i.e 163rd Brigade for central and Western regions, 151 Brigade for eastern region and 167 Brigade for Northern and West Nile regions.
Because of corruption and patronage by end of late 80s most Men who had joined the NRA before capturing Kampala were holding the rank of Sgt. Commanders would reward their cooks, escorts, drivers, friends, concubines etc with the rank of Sgt. Some influential Senior Officers would even promote their own preferences to the officer ranks. With small money some individuals would EVEN buy ranks. This anomaly is partly to blame for the burning of the Republic House (Army Headquarters) in 1989.

When formal ranks were introduced Museveni landed the highest rank of Lt. Gen followed by Major Generals Tumwine, Saleh, and Rwigyema. Below them were Brigadiers Kanyankole, Tinyefuza , Kyaligonza and Kategaya (who was given a honorary Brigadier). By Officers service numbers, Kategaya is 002 after Museveni who is 001. Museveni deliberately awarded him a honorary rank in order to keep him away from the main stream military. Below them were the Colonels Chihandae, Cheif Ali, Lumumba, Otafiire, Mushega, Muntu and another Mugisha. Below came the Lt. Colonels like Dr. Besigye, Nasur Izaruk, Dr. Bata, Sserwanga Lwanga, Kashilingi, etc. Below them came the Majors who comprised of both officers who had been senior Officers (SOs) and those who had been Junior Officers at the fall of Kampala. Below them came the Captains like Aronda, Kayihura etc. Below them came the Lts and 2Lts. The rank of Major had the highest concentration of dissatisfaction as it was used as the dumping ground of those who had deserved more senior positions but because they had fallen victim to the internal bickering over positions they had to be punished i.e Italikire Kiiza who had been a Captain in the Amin Army, played a crucial role in training the NRA and became a Senior Officer in the bush but ended up being given a major with his juniors.
Generally, awarding of formal ranks was Museveni’s first step to personalise the NRA. Though the high ranks dis not match with the level of training it served its major purpose of neutralizing the ranks held by those who were joining the NRA from other armies e.g UNLA, UNRF, FUNA, UFM/FEDEMO, UPDA, the gratifying of the contribution made by different individuals while punishing the disobedient NRAs. The Baganda who had tirelessly fought in the Luwero war got a raw deal.

At the time (1987/88) the Twaliires likes of Katumba Wamala, JJ Odong, Otema, and others who had just joined NRA from UNLA were mere Lts. Angina and Tolit were 2nd Lts. Wilson Mbadi was a recruit in Kabamba while the late 1985 entrants like David Muhoozi, Bantariza, Mugira, Mayombo, Kyanda, Kayanja Muhanga, Tony Owana were Privates. Muhoozi the first son was in primary school.

Between 1988 -late 90s promotions in the NRA took the following forms:

1. Catching the attention of the Commander in Chief or upon recommendation of a God father Senior officer or politician. This is how most of the Western axis late 1985 entrants like Mugira, Mayombo, Bantariza, Rwakitarate, David Muhoozi and many others plus the bulk of and the now senior ISO Officers were commissioned as Lts without any Officer training or command exposure. Some remnants of of the bush war got elevation while some got stuck either on the same rank or none at all todate. In this way totally illiterate and semi illiterate officers were commissioned.

2. Cadet training – the first Officer Cadet training was conducted by the Tanzanians and attended by a bulk of late 1985 entrants and post take over candidates around 1987/88. The bulk of them them took up junior command and administrative positions from where they have since risen to very senior positions. During the proceeding years, Cadet courses continued to be conducted at Jinja producing quite a number of Officers. However, they have since been phased in favor of the current Muhoozi Officer Corps. Such officers are the likes of Col. Wakalo, Col. Emmy Mulindwa, Igumba and many others. The few luck ones like Dan Tizihwayo, Kayanja Muhanga, Stephene Kashure, and a few others continue to thrive while their other course mates lost out completely. At the beginning of the century the practice of recruiting civilians and taking them for Cadet training commenced. At one time, some cadet officers were put under the radar over suspicion that they had been infiltrated into the training by the then opposition Reform Agenda.

3. Those from other armies retained their ranks and a few progressed to senior ranks especially those who had junior ranks while many lost out. Over the years the rebel groups from West Nile and Northern Uganda had been abandoning rebellion and among the terms of surrender was the provision to retain their ranks. Museveni has handled this by not assigning them to command positions i.e UNRF’s Ali Bamuze and Group including Taban Amin, LRA’s Banya and group, etc.

4. There was/ is also the practice of commissioning soldiers to officer ranks because of their university education without going through any form of Officer training or command exposure. This was common with departments like intelligence, medical, finance, ISO, former PPU etc. There are the likes of Mayombo, Balya, Mugira, Bantariza etc

5. For Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs), training and promotions had been suspended for many years almost throughout the late 80s and 90s. This led to many NCOs getting stuck on the same rank for over a decade while some were holding officer responsibilities in both Command and administrative positions. Around the late 90s the ranks of WO and Staff Sgt (S/Sgt) were introduced that saw a number of some of these senior NCOs elevated. Also, a short Cadet Course (6 months) was arranged for some NCOs who fell in this category whereby they were elevated to LTs. Lucky enough even some of these NCOs who work in stores, procurement, intelligence, VIP protection, Finance etc had accumulated huge financial fortunes that they could not mind much about promotions. The best example was of now Member of Parliament LT (RTD) Saleh Kamba who remained a Sgt for over a decade but was living like a Brigadier.

When the 1st Son Muhoozi came to the scene first as a member of the Local Defence Units (LDU), recruitment for Officer Cadet took the form of selective and secret recruitment. The first batches of his trainees have since then taken over command of strategic and sensitive positions. In the same vein those officers who have ever served under the President’s protection Unit (PPU) and now SFG are given priority to take over command of the regular army units.

Because there is no Army Establishment, Museveni created the rank of Ag i.e Ag. Col, Ag Brig, etc. He uses it where he is a bit shy to promote a junior person to a certain position and as the rest go to sleep he confirms that such person to the intended rank. For the same reasons the practice extends to acting appointments i.e Ag. Chief of Staff, Ag. Div Commander etc. The practice is also used where Museveni wishes to deny the affected officer full powers and the accruing confidence to execute his duties.

Appointments to both command and administrative positions is supposed to match with the rank and training of the affected officer. Since promotions are done without following any established procedures it is very common to find an officer staying on the same rank for decades while others are fast tracked to higher ranks. In many cases the rank and appointment held by some officers does not match with the training and experience but is based on shear preferential treatment, sectarianism and patronage. Appointment to some sensitive positions like in intelligence, SFG, Finance, Mechanised, artillery and air defence etc, depend on Political clarity (personal loyalty to Museveni). Where appointment to top command position is made fpr someone whose political clarity is in doubt but just for purposes of hoodwinking the unsuspecting public, obviously a tested loyal cadre is deployed to deputise such officer hence rendering him ceremonial while the real power lies with the 2nd in Command. That scenario is reinforced by the emergence of Muhoozi’s SFG as the controller of all the sensitive units which are simply attached to the regular units while their command and control is retained by SFG.

It is a presumption that any soldier who is mentally and physically fit if given the necessary training, exposure, facilitation and with a sound political leadership can accomplish a given military task. The situation under Museveni’s NRA is of selective recruitment, training, deployment, promotion, exposure and logistical facilitation depending on the particular commander’s political clarity. This political clarity consideration is undermining career development, morale and performance. Appointment to command and administrative positions is seen as being more of a means of enriching or bribery while punishing those whose political clarity is in doubt. Some sensitive units now under the control of SFG have ring fenced their command and administrative positions for only those with proved political clarity. On the contrary, those whose political clarity is in doubt are rendered inactive or not deployed for long periods (katebe).

Given the situation as outlined above, it is clear that there is stampede in the rank and file of the NRA. Obviously there is disgruntlement and a lot of malcontent inside there but since it amounts to high treason to express displeasure, the affected officers simply pray for divine intervention. Museveni is reluctant to retire them for fear that they will join the opposition. He has been buying time for these aged officers to depreciate more as he strengthens his SFG under the command of his son. It is for the same reasons that he is currently deploying these officers to civilian institutions like NAADs and other poverty alleviation projects. We are yet to witness more of such officers being seconded to more other civil sectors.The situation is expected to worsen with the impending withdraw of his troops from Somalia and South Sudan unless as usual he manipulates the situation to ensure his continued survival.

museveni is now stuck with his officers whose promotion and appointments have not been following the established procedures but instead have been based on his personal interest of regime survival.




I trust that the progress in the struggle is getting clearer by the day. We all know that fighting liberation struggles is never easy but with focus and commitment, victory is ultimately attainable. So we should proceed with what we think will make the ultimate difference.

I intend to cover this subject in two parts. The first one will cover the concept and the second will try to discuss the modalities of the opposition unity or cooperation, whichever is desirable at any given time. The second part will be covered in the subsequent essay.
Right from the start, it is vital to define what I mean here by opposition leaders. I wish to state that I use the term in its broadest sense possible. It transcends the usual dichotomy of the standard groups that form opposition parties to those in governments. For our purpose, it should include all other social, economic and political forces of any type that may wish a change in the status Quo.
To this end therefore, I include even some individuals or groups who may otherwise be categorised as being in government of the day. Why is this important?


1- The first is because of the nature of the current political structure in the country. Because the ruling party NRM is fused with the state, it is difficult to draw the line of who are real NRM supporters and those I consider INDIRECT CONSCRIPTS to the system. Since all the jobs are appended to the NRM party, including those in the Judiciary, parliament, civil service and even the OMBUDSMAN ( IGG) who must be a government functionary, people have lost the natural space to oppose the system. So the kind of opposition is COVERT (silent and hidden). That is why it is always a shock to Mr Museveni when he loses an election like what happened in Luweero recently. Or the many defeats he has suffered in Kampala city. To him, the easier explanation is that the opposition has stolen the vote! How can the opposition steal the vote when all the presiding officers are yours? The explanation here is simple. EVEN THOSE PRESIDING OFFICERS BELONG TO THE OPPOSITION AND SO DOES THE MAJORITY OF VOTERS. So the voting is genuine but he does not understand that his “conscripts” turn against him in the privacy of their voting booths. That is why armed thugs, in civilian clothes are now being trained so that they look into the voting booths in 2016 (the Kabalye graduates).

As said above, Mr Museveni has understood this now. And he is trying to solve it by militarising all those people who will be handling the 2016 polls. Those young people undergoing secret training in Kabalye under Gen Kayihura are to fulfil this endeavour. Museveni knows that using the formal UPDF and POLICE is going to be difficult. He can’t trust them enough either. So him and his criminal gangs are setting up AUXILIARY forces (irregular and illegal) in the name of CRIME PREVENTERS. Unlike the Kiboko Squad which was rag tag just hurriedly assembled in Central Police Station (CPS) by Kayihura, these are being set up, trained and will be armed ultimately.
To conclude this point, it is clear that the opposition is more extensive than is normally understood. It includes the majority of our people who have been made beggars but forced to wear the dirty yellow t-shirt rugs called party dress of NRM.

2- The second reason is the LEGAL FRAUD Museveni has thrived on for long. Take UPDF for instance, our constitution decrees it as a nonpartisan force. But what is it in reality? Mr Museveni has, through duplicity and brute force made it an appendage of his NRM party. But the majority of UPDF are not NRM. That is why you find a DP candidate in Entebbe Municipality winning an MP seat where the bulk of the electorate are SFC soldiers, Air Force and Marines and their wives. Why opposition politicians have been winning those seats where the UPDF soldiers make the majority. You can crosscheck these figures, but in the last election of 2011, Museveni lost in the following polling stations which were intended for the military; Mbuya, Makindye, Kasenyi (the training school for SFC) etc. This was the trend all over the country. Otherwise how would Hon Mao win in Gulu, Winnie Byanyima in Mbarara municipality, Harry Kasigwa in Jinja around barracks etc.

The situation was worse in the police. That is why Mr Museveni used to publically refer to the police force as ” an enemy” and in one address at Kololo in 2007,he declared, ” with the new commanders there, we shall not allow the police to remain an enemy detach” . This was after replacing Gen Katumba with Kayihura.

3- The third reason is that by the nature of the post-colonial African states, in many instances, there is very little difference between these political groupings. It would take a genius to decipher what makes them different than what makes them similar. After all, Africa suffered a miscarriage after independence (or is it STILLBIRTH?) As such, putting emphasis on these COMPRADOR BOURGEISIE outfits (political parties) and using their artificial categorisations would be to serve the same enemy. We must therefore reject the limitation of our space when organising our people for political action.

HOW THEN SHOULD THE “ACTIVE” OPPOSITION RELATE TO THE “SILENT” OPPOSITION (e.g., how to deal with some Museveni Ministers, commanders, ambassadors, RDCs, etc.)

My views on this subject are very clear. I prefer taking a broader strategic approach that leads to the mass involvement of our people in their own liberation. I start by recognising that the ordinary African / Ugandan has been conned and left destitute. As such, his salvation cannot depend on the same fraudulent gimmicks that has led to his current misery. This means that we must define our enemy carefully, set our means clearly and set our operational grounds carefully.
That is why, for instance, we should not concentrate on targeting some of the individual ministers of Museveni etc., who Museveni uses to avoid blame by making them appear to do all the dirty projects but actually using junior officers under them but still uses them as the fall guys. When we concentrate on the people who are wrongly defined as the CENTRE OF GRAVITY of the killer regimes, we compromise our capacity to concentrate on the real enemy. If, many of these ministers were to die any time soon, it would have no impact on the Museveni dictatorship.

As that Chinese general SUN-TZU( 544-496B.C) put it long time ago, that the job of a true warrior is to know the enemy as well as he knows himself.

That “He who knows self but not the enemy will suffer one defeat for every victory. He who knows neither self nor enemy will fail in every battle.”

So in our case, who is the real enemy? What is the centre of gravity of that dictatorship? If we are to win, where should we attack, where should we forge alliances and where should we lay in strategic wait? All of us who want victory must study all the above and make sure we understand them fully.

So it is vital to master the forms and dispositions we take as we organise. How we deploy our energies and the form we assume will determine victory or failure. For instance, why would it be me to be the one to urge comrades not to target Mr Mbabazi, Mr Kutesa, Mr Otafiire, Gen Moses Ali, Mr Moses Kigongo etc.? After all, am the one living in exile here. I would be the last person to say such! So why do I say so? Because I know that a Museveni fighting with a Mr Mbabazi is weaker, not stronger. It is just common sense really! But most important is because i understand how the enemy works and I am able to define my potential allies from current foes.


I want all those people still serving the Museveni dictatorship to know that they don’t need Museveni to remain alive, to survive, for their children to remain safe and happy in the new Uganda. They must know that Museveni uses them as expendables, all. And because they are not the centre of gravity of the Museveni dictatorship, they can expire any time. Just like Mr Mbabazi, Prof Bukenya etc. expired in a second. Of course these defections do not make Museveni stronger either.

But to decisively defeat the enemy, we must have the capacity to undermine the cohesion of the enemy by recruiting from his ranks. It is the Sauls that we must target and not be content with keeping the original 12! In any case, the original 12 also can reduce with a Judas branching off. We must have the capacity to attract those near him. We must have the capacity to isolate the enemy and attack his heart.


So the right way to proceed would be;

First is to attack the Museveni strategy of holding on to power. We must ask ourselves, what has he used to subjugate us all this long? It cannot be by accident.

The second is to attack his alliances, who are these?
Then the third is to attack his weakened violent machinery which effectively keeps him in power (the real centre of gravity for the dictatorship) Even this must be studied carefully to isolate the individual actors from the institutions themselves. E.g. we shall note that many of the abuses are carried out by auxiliary forces under Kale Kayihura.

For instance, I know for a fact the many instances that Mr Museveni has quietly deployed against his own ministers, commanders etc. to check their perceived ambitions. I remember when one very senior minister, otherwise thought to be among the untouchables was being fought by gen Kayihura during the 2011 elections. We all knew who was behind it and what the real purpose was.

I also know how Mr Museveni would love to see the in fights in the political parties, even in NRM, the misunderstandings between e.g. Prof Bukenya and Hon Mbabazi or Otafire etc. These gentlemen need to reconcile and know that we all must reconcile and never fight Mr Museveni’s wars for him. They weaken them and strengthen him. We need to understand these things because they impact on the overall struggle.

I refuse to fight Hon Mbabazi, or Prof Bukenya, or Dr Besigye or Mr Olara Otunnu, etc. Neither am I going to waste time positioning myself for leadership after the defeat of Mr Museveni. It wastes precious time and increases infighting and intrigue. Especially when what we are fighting about (so called power) is only in our minds! How can you waste your time and energy fighting over what you don’t have? Power has been with Mr Museveni for the last 28 years. Yet the opposition keep tearing up each other for what they really do not have. The emphasis should be on how to get this power from the one abusing it. Because if you start fighting over it now, what then will you do when you really have it? By fighting on what we don’t have, we are helping the one who has it to keep! So on this one, we need to trust the people. They are capable of choosing the best leader provided they are empowered to do so. That is why this liberation process must be for their empowerment.


We therefore need to reach out to everybody. To appeal to their consciences. For them to understand they can exist without Museveni. We need to isolate Museveni the man, the one who has used the 28 uninterrupted years to build a coercive machine around himself. The Museveni system, which is nothing except himself.

To win this war of liberation, we need to appreciate that it is a new type of struggle, that we require a new approach and a new understanding of the enemy. The starting point for all the revolutionary forces is for each of us to look into the mirror and see our own weaknesses and failures, now and days past. Once we do that, then we WIN. Then we shall be able to unite all the forces that desire change.

Mr Museveni has in his government all sorts of people who were fighting him yesterday. He has long understood that accepting everyone was not only a source of strength, but an antidote against future rebellion. He has and still works with all leaders, from the leaders of FOBA to UPA,NALU, UPDM, commanders of Lakwena, Kony etc. he works with all, buys all and of course betrays most. Why then has the opposition found it difficult to understand the strength of true unity?

We need to go beyond the unhelpful dichotomy of who was wrong or right yesterday or today. We need to overcome “the self-atoning prison of our own righteousness” For each of us’s presupposed righteousness is useless if it does not bring about victory.


Gen David Sejusa



Sarah Kagingo is Museveni’s Special Presidential Assistant in charge of communication. She is a Muslim from Mbarara District. She was a Guild President of Makerere University during 1997/98. After graduating she worked with Museveni’s brother, Gen. Saleh where they were instrumental in campaigning for Museveni’ selection.

In April 2013 Museveni appointed her his Special Media Advisor. Since then she has introduced Museveni to the social platform thus bringing him closer to the online community through timely updates on Twitter and Facebook. Later she was promoted to the position of Special Presidential Assistant on Communication. As such, Museveni was recently voted as the most influential African leader on Twitter. Because of her position she has since got closer to the Museveni more than anybody else. She travels alot with him both within and outside the country. In that way she has the security clearance to physically access Museveni at her own convenience to the extent of sometimes riding in the same car with him. In an interview with one of the Dailies she had this to say “I’d like to be remembered as one who woke up a government to the social media and how I communicated the President’s activities promptly”.

Of recent Sarah Kagingo has hit headlines following Local TV footage showing the Police rescuing a 16 years old girl from residence whom they claimed was a her maid that she was allegedly abusing. Later on her reaction was that the said girl was her own relative and not a maid whom her haters were using in their efforts to bring her down. It has also emerged that Sarah Kagingo had earlier filed a criminal case of assault against Major Edith Nakalema but the Police is reluctant to follow it up.

RO 08654 Major Edith Nakalema is a soldier under Museveni’s SFG and a Private Secretary to Museveni. She hails from Kashari in Mbarara District and is married to Major Jimmy Ansizua. Though born decades after Uganda gained independence, she was awarded an Independence Medal. When she was a Captain she together with the First son’s wife Chalotte to champion Mama Kazi – a scheme to enhance income of SFG soldiers whose commanding officer is the first son Brig. Muhoozi. There has been several complaints from both military and civilian staff of State House over Nakalema’s high handedness. She recently inhumanly terminated and the employment of civilian cooks before disgracefully chasing them from all State House installations including Rwakitura. Now there is this new allegation of assaulting a fellow employee Sarah Kagingo.


She is a former Private Secretary to Museveni who was replaced by Major Edith Nakalema. She is the wife of Anania Tumukunde who was Museveni’s Advisor on IT before he was arrested in the UK and convicted over money laundering charges. It is alleged that she was dropped partly because of her husband’s activities.


As the saying goes: Once bitten by a snake you fear lizards. In the past Museveni fathered children with a State House house keeper whom he has since then turned into a second lady housed at Kisozi Ranch. It is said that one of the tasks of Maj. Nakalema is to keep off ladies from getting close to Museveni. Sarah Kagigo is an attractive young lady and is not married. She was offered the job by Museveni personally and she described it thus “I was excited to receive a call from the President and had to take up the job”. She at times moves in the same car with the Museveni. Her social media project has so much moved Museveni that at times he takes selfies with a mobile phone. Remember the scene during the burial of Mandela where Michelli Obama was not comfortable with the Obama’s selfies. Amid Kagingo’s woes, Museveni and the First Lady were at Major Nakalema’s home in Mbarara attending a thank giving ceremony. It has since emerged that Museveni was dragged to the ceremony by the First Lady and and son Muhoozi.


Museveni’s inner security circle is manned by the most trusted soldiers. Major Nakalema could be one of them. All those soldiers that civilians that have physical access to Museveni undergo periodic security vetting. Given the growing dissent among Ugandans against Museveni’s governance, his physical security is an issue. However, there are civilian staff like cooks, housekeepers, drivers, medical personnel etc that can not be denied access to Museveni. Kagingo also falls in this category. His security intelligence runs a surveillance on such staff members who get close proximity to the President. It develops profiles pertaining to ‘political clarity’, morale, private life pertaining to social connections with members of the public. This security clearance extends to all soldiers under the SFG as at one time now Capt Tinka who had been deployed by the army headquarters as the RSM to the then PGB was rejected while much earlier on Asingura Kagoro was given one hour to vacate PPU in the late 80s. It is not clear how easy it is for the intelligence to secretly carry out surveillance on Kagingo to the Mosque for prayers. This ensurers that such people are not compromised (used to cause physical harm to Museveni). This is how Kisembo his chief driver who had driven him for over a decade was recently disgracefully dropped. Currently Museveni is carrying out a militarisation process of most civilian institutions. As of now out of his seven drivers, five are soldiers.

In the bush when there was a challenge to his leadership from some section of his fighters, he isolated his command post with barricades and surrounded himself with the likes of Saleh, Rwigyema as his immediate neighbors. History is repeating itself. However, in the instant case it is not likely that Kagingo is a security threat unless her enemies frame her up. But again, is she not entitled to security guards from the SFG and if so how comes that according to TV footage, her residence was kind of deserted with only a maid allegedly some days.


It is undisputed that State House is a center of most of the shoddy deals where the country has lost large chunks of tax payer’s money. Most of the corruption scandals have either originated from, sought protection or ended up silenced by state house. Some reliable sources confirm that because of large money deals being coordinated by state house account for the level of intrigue among the staff members. It is in this regard tha on the ongoing railway saga Museveni stated thus “corrupt officials in State House had stolen minutes of the delicate meeting with investors and shared them with a rival Chinese company”. At one time he even claimed that his signature had been forged.

There are many behind the scene politicking that take place in State House that are designed to suffocate democracy in Uganda but they are often denied in public. Now that Sarah Kagingo is keeping track of Museveni’s engagements and making them public immediately, wont it in one way or the other incriminate Museveni in the shoddy dealings hence denying him room for denials? This question can only be answered by Museveni himself.


Kagingo was offered the job through a personal phone call by Museveni. She has been working for Museveni as a person and is not a public servant. Since the current saga started, Museveni has not comeout clear and Kagingo continues to serve him. It is only Museveni who can terminate her services either because of security breach which should have been immediate or at the insistence of the First Lady through Maj. Nakalema.Otherwise Kagingo may be reaping what she sowed by riding on the tiger’s back.



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