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Day February 19, 2009

Buganda had no negotiators during colonialism


1/8  The language that was used by the colonial administrators in relation to the Kabaka of Buganda, in this case Kabaka Mutesa II was “interview”, “summon the Kabaka and educate him”, “bring the Kabaka to his senses”, “acceptance of decisions of future co-operation”, “if he refuses to comply”, “in the interview I shall require the Kabaka”….etc.  All those are quotations from a memorandum by the British Colonial secretary, Oliver Lyttelton around the 1953 crisis which as you very well know culminated in the Kabaka being shut out of Buganda.

 

2/8  Alternatively, let us  look back at some years earlier at the situation of Kabaka Mutesa II’s grandfather, Kabaka Mwanga, following the events of 24 Jan 1892 when a Catholic shot and killed a Protestant at Mengo, all in self-defence.  Kabaka Mwanga (himself a Catholic) tried the culprit and duly acquitted him.  Capt. Lugard demanded that the catholic be handed to him for trial and execution.  Kabaka Mwanga rightly deemed that to be an infringement on his authority and he refused Lugard’s orders.  Lugard immediately issued rifles to Protestants, deployed his Sudanese troops with two Maxim guns and by the time the “negotiation” dust settled, the Kabaka with his Catholic followers were out of Mengo, on to Bulingugwe Island at the mouth of Murchison Bay, where they were flushed out, running on to Bukoba.  Buganda negotiators!  What negotiation was that?  Of course you know how Kabaka Muwanga’s reign eventually ended in 1897.  Negotiation?

 

3/8: Bottom line, there was no question of negotiation!  For anyone to think otherwise is to be deluded, and is to harbour false loyalty to Buganda; and an impression of non-existent glory.  That cannot help us, you and I, to grow up.

 

4/8  Am also not aware that Buganda affairs were addressed in the British Foreign Office and not Colonial Office , particularly because it was not the case.  The fact is that, the affairs of Buganda were formally passed on to the Colonial Office in 1902, and not because they were up to that time in the hands of the Foreign Office, but because they were in the hands of the War Office: Buganda was still being ‘pacified’. 

 

5/8  The 1900 agreement that set the terms of the relations between Buganda and Britain clearly states under Article 3, that, Buganda “shall rank as a Province of equal rank with any other provices into which the Protectorate shall be divided” In other words, Buganda was a province (just like Karamoja) and not a country to be related with through the Foreign Office.

 

6/8  In fact the 1953 crisis was precipitated by Kabaka Mutesa’s (deluded) insistence that Buganda should be moved from the colonial office to the Foreign office, and immediately granted independence.  If it was  “for quite a long time” as you are saying under the Foreign Office, then what was the Kabaka demanding for?

 

7/8  I am sure Buganda historians have heard about the letter that Kabaka Mutesa wrote on 6th August 1953 in reaction to the Colonial Secretary’s mention of the possibility of an East Africa Federation.  In that letter, Kabaka Mutesa made three demands, namely, that, there would never be a federation of East African territories, second, that Buganda affairs be transferred to the Foreign Office from the Colonial Office, third, that Buganda be given independence.  That was a violation of Article 6 of the 1900 “agreement” (really 1900 Undertaking by Buganda to be good boys!)….see the ‘agreement’ at this link: http://www.buganda.com/buga1900..htm.

 

8/8  Yes, there was a difference between the British Foreign Office and Colonial Office.  I am sure Buganda historians also know it now particularly as it relates to Buganda’s history.  The difference between those two offices is what caused the 1953 crisis, when Kabaka Mutesa wanted to negotiate, and the other party wanted to interview, give orders, and if necessary, fight it out.  Very clearly, Buganda negotiators if there were any, were hapless, hopeless and jobless.

Uganda peasants are not Tax payers?


Which tax payer?  Who is their political class accountable to?  Once again, I will tell people that  the population of Uganda has no solid stake in the management of public affairs because it lives outside that domain: 85% peasants, dying at 45 years of age, living in a non-monetary sector, in the rural countryside, untaxable because they do not produce any surplus to be taxed, about 50% of them are illiterate, 50.2% 15 years and below, wearing nappies, the highest in the world….that is not the kind of population that takes its government to task.  Never!

 

We need to start thinking less traditionally about our socio-political reality.  The whole notion of ‘tax-payer’ is completely out of place in Uganda.

 

That aid is unearned income and you know what unearned income does.  If government was depending on money deducted from 20 million Ugandans wage earners, it would think twice before squandering it.  It would be someone’s sweat and they would demand for accountability.  But who in Uganda identifies with ‘donor’ aid as his money? If we do not come to grips with the relationship between paying tax and governmental accountability, then we shall keep fooling ourselves for ever with democracy for ever.

 

That is why I always insist that we need to proletarianise the population-urgently-create wage earners, get rid of the passive peasant class.  A population that is largely wage-earners or proletariat is a population that you do not fool around with.  The impunity of our political class now is a logical consequence of the fact that the country is largely peasant.  That is why some of them are interested in preserving that passive class that will vote for them just because of a piece of soap.  A wage labourer will tell you not to insult him by bribing him with money he contributed as PAYE or income tax. 
What tax do the peasants pay?  

 

“They … removed UPC I government because they wanted to scuttle public spending”

 

The Common Mans Charter may have talked about increase in ‘public spending’, but for those that engineered the deposition of AM Obote, ‘public spending’ per se was not the primary problem.  The real problem was the source of finances for such expenditure: expropriation/nationalisation of foreign owned enterprises.  That was the primary contradiction.

 

We know that Uganda was broke right from the cradle: independence was on 9 oct 1962, 24 hours later, on 10 oct 1962 there was no money to finance the return of the colonial administrators to London.  The first structural adjustment facility was arranged there and then (what ever structures there were to adjust on day one).  If AM Obote had asked for grants to finance his ‘public spending’ (whatever that means) instead of expropriating foreign multinationals, he would probably have lived longer and may be succumbed to internal contradictions. 

 

Remember also there was the contradiction between the two global powers.  AM Obote played into that with the adventure to the left, to defend a non-existent proletariat, as though that was the country’s primary challenge….remember the Blue Belt and Red Corridor?

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