On 30th Nov 1953, when the Governor Sir Andrew Cohen surmoned Sir Edward Muteesa to Government House in Entebbe, after Sir Edward refused to budge from the numerous threats made towards him, Sir Cohen handed him the deportation order. Without looking at it, Sir Edward passed it over to his Katikkiro, Owek. Paulo Kavuma, and kept on staring at the Governor. He (Sir Edward) just calmly asked them, “Does this mean that I am under arrest?” The Governor hissed out, “Yes”. Two white constables then walked in to take away the Kabaka. He then allowed them to walk him out of the office. Upon reaching outside, his deputy ADC, Robert Ntambi (RIP) being concerned over the safety of his Kabaka asked him, “Ssebo, nkube?”, meaning “Sir, should I shoot the bastards?” Sir Edward being the Royal and British trained military personnel he was, replied calmly with wisdom and guidance, “Tokuba, baleke” meaning “Just let the poor souls be!”
Please note that Sir Edward himself was armed with a revolver which he later handed over to the accompanying British officer in the aeroplane when they were already airborne, and could have done a Terrance Hill to those two poor souls, but he couldn’t kill an innocent man. And lo, some Baganda bashers and haters spew lies on this forum of how Sir Edward killed innocent Banyoro in Karuguza, my foot!
Actually, Sir Edward was not only a British trained military officer, but was an instructor himself in the Grenadier Guards. As one might guess, British Army is not some taka taka African army where some officer might be made an instructor simply because of some top connections. Sir Edward was worthy his pips and medals and so, had to make the right decision at the right time after weighing a situation that deserves a split of a second action.
Sir Edward though still a minor, had the advantage of receiving lectures from his father; the late Sir Daudi Ccwa II. It was not just by chance that he was made the 35th Kabaka of Buganda. The British had tried to do the same to Sir Daudi Ccwa II, himself also a trained British Officer, but he was much wiser for them also. The Cohen Plan “B” was to be executed in the beginning of November 1939 (Note the coincidence of the month of November) by the then Governor, Sir Philip Mitchell, but due to the failing health of the Ssabasajja, the British thought it unwise in Military Strategic terms, to appear to be antagonising a sickly man (equivalent of shooting a defenceless man in the back). They instead banked on ‘terrorizing’ the next of kin. Unfortunately for them, the next of kin was even more tough a nut to crack than Sir Daudi Ccwa II.
When I tell some Ugandans that Sir Edward’s resistance to the British gave a booster shot in the arm of the Mau Mau, they cant comprehend that history. You see, sometimes we just cannot write the whole thing down here on the forum for theUgandans to understand everything.
Robert Nviri
Respectable Buganda Nationalist
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Don’t worry over radio closures; NRM needs them more
By Asuman Bisiika
One of the outcomes from the riots that recently rocked Kampala is what many in the media fraternity say is the receding shoreline of media freedoms.
The particulars are that four FM radio stations were switched off air for what the Uganda Broadcasting Council said was failure to adhere to the minimum broadcasting standards.
This action has been perceived as a government crackdown on media freedoms. However, it offers us an opportunity to renew the debate on media freedoms in Uganda from 1986 to date. And here…
NRM and the Media
The relative press freedom in Uganda is the result of the experience and spirit of the armed rebel movement that mothered the political leadership in power to day.
During the armed struggle, the rebel movement pursued what they called a policy of ‘open criticism and open debate’ as a tool to resolve disagreements. It is this openness they brought to government when they assumed state power in 1986. This formed the basis for a deliberate government deportment to run an open administration.
Needless to say, this posture was the basis for the liberalisation of the electronic media and the resurgent influence of the print media on social and political behaviour.
What is now viewed as the receding shoreline of press freedom is therefore merely an administrative action without any long term effect on the spirit or the thinking of the people.
For instance, the government needs bimeza (community open-air field broadcasts) as much as the opposition (perceived or real). It is worth noting that these bimeza had become part of the NRM mobilisation strategy that they too (NRM) will feel denuded without them.
The bimeza (and other innovations like call-in formats of guest-host radio talk shows) offered the only way to identify and develop political cadres (they are now called activists). I can bet my white bull that they bimeza will return (in a different form or otherwise).
Media freedom
The 1995 Uganda Constitution was very clear on interest political groups to wit: all political parties must have a national character qualified by a demonstrable existence of support in two thirds of all the districts of Uganda. This provision was aimed to avoid Kabaka Yeka type of self-interest political movements of the early sixties.
The main aspect in the debate on media freedoms in Uganda now is therefore the challenge to reconcile the media’s traditional role as the vehicle of civil and civic awareness and what I will refer to as the immergence of ‘interest journalism’, if I am allowed to coin a word. And how did we reach here?
In the absence of organised political groups between 1986 and 2006 (non-partisan Movement Era), the media was viewed by the political leadership as a function of political (almost ideological) mobilisation.
That is how what Charles Onyango-Obbo calls the Political Commentariat evolved as a force in the media and Uganda’s body politic. However, the political elite could only be tolerant to the media in so far as there was no organised political contest at the time.
When competitive political contests resurfaced in 1996, the media had generated a lot of public interest (and it had itself gained a politically acceptable stature) in public affairs. The major friction between media and the state therefore no longer derived from the flimsy cases of defamation but the influence of civic and civil attitudes.
So, the gist of the debate on press freedoms in Uganda now is whether the media should play the role of a passive rapporteur or that of an ‘interested functionary’ in the socio-political dynamics.
Political Journalism
The problem however lies in the ideological construction of the body politic. Without any conspicuous ideological differences among political groups, The Thinking of Buganda (or Mmengo) offers what looks like an ideological model of political mobilisation. It is therefore not surprising that all political groups (even the ruling NRM) have tended to gravitate to Mmengo.
And that is why all Luganda vernacular media outlets (print and electronic) have Mmengo leaning editorial content or posture to tap into what I have called ‘The Thinking of Buganda’ to enrich their acceptability. The question then is: how can the media survive in such circumstances?
The media must reconcile its traditional role of being the avante guarde constituent of the functional civil society with the realities of socio-political dynamics obtaining on the ground. It is all about judgment; and it is my personal assessment that Central Broadcasting Services (CBC), Mmengo’s very influential FM radio, failed on balancing this act.
Here is the rider: With the liberalisation of the media, the control and dissemination of information is no longer the exclusive preserve of the state. This has rendered the state as merely ‘first among equals’ in the field. However, information as a constituent tool for rallying the nation for policy absorption and conscientious national consciousness remains the responsibility of the state.
Mukadde wange Robert Nviiri, just a correction to the heading above your rather wonderful and well informed narration…I am pretty sure and confident you meant to refer to MUTEESA 11 NOT MUTEESA 1, the former being SSekabaka Walugembe Muteesa 11, the father of Kabaka Muwenda Mutebi 11; and the latter being Muteesa 1 Mukaabya Walugembe Kayiira, who is said to have had 85 wives.